@article{4119,
  author = {Mark Fey and Kristopher W. Ramsay and Jidong Chen},
  title = {A Non-Speculation Theorem with Applications to Committee Design},
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				<span>Various well known agreement theorems show that if players have common knowledge of actions and {\textquotedblleft}veto{\textquotedblright} option is feasible (</span><span>Geanakoplos 1994</span><span>), then they cannot agree to forgo a Pareto optimal outcome simply because of private information in settings with unique equilibrium. We establish a non- speculation theorem, which is more general than </span><span>Geanakoplos </span><span>(</span><span>1994</span><span>) and can be applicable to political institutions that generate multiple equilibria. We apply this result to a problem of designing an independent committee free of private persuasion.~</span>
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  year = {2017},
  journal = {BE Journal of Theoretical Economics},
  volume = {17},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2015-0103},
  language = {eng},
}